Curtis Matwychuk-Goodman

—

The highest expression of friendship has been described as being love based in marriage and that which is based in virtuous moral character.  It has been articulated as being based within action, where certain expressions make true friendships possible for humanity.  When friendship exists, an individual is able to develop morally, intellectually and spiritually.  Since all individual actions are aggregated within society, when there is a greater occurrence of true friendship between the self and others, there is a type of intellectual and moral transcendence that society itself experiences.  In turn, engaging true friendships can be thought of as beneficial to humanity.

I will argue here that true friendship is based in recognition of others, spirituality, intellectual acuity, and first begins with knowing oneself.  True friendship is made possible by distinct expressions of human action and feelings.  This paper will provide perspective on true friendship by utilizing texts written in the enlightenment and ancient periods of thought.  Specifically this paper will compare and contrast the writings of the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard on marriage from Part II of “Either/Or” with the writings on ethics and virtue friendship by ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle as found in Books VIII and IX of the “Nicomachean Ethics.” The idea of marriage and true friendship will be used somewhat interchangeably.

The structure of this paper will first focus on the main argument of Kierkegaard from the first chapter, “The Esthetic Validity of Marriage,” from Part II in Either/Or.  This discussion will center on interpreting Judge William’s letter to a younger friend and his understanding of marriage as true friendship.  True friendship for Kierkegaard is based within a strong relationship with God.  His discussion is predicated on the belief human nature is either – to conquer, or to possess.  In marriage one is able to possess and has no need to conquer which seems to indicate a transcendence of human nature.  Such a relationship allows for the concrete development of humans because it is a process of internal and external self-realization.  In this way, Kierkegaard believes a marriage builds a relationship with God which makes it eternal, historical and morally correct.

Following Kierkegaard’s main argument a brief review of relevant secondary literature will be discussed as the second part of this paper.  In particular this paper will review: Amy Hall’s “Kierkegaard and the Treachery of Love;” Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love: Divine Command and Moral Obligation by Stephen Evans; and Graham M. Smith’s “Kierkegaard from the Point of View of The Political.”  This portion will attempt to dissect each article’s main interpretation of Kierkegaard’s understanding of marriage.  In doing so it will broaden this paper’s understanding of Kierkegaard’s true friendship and will seek to answer the question – is friendship based in marriage really the ultimate form of transcendence for humans?

The third section of this paper will present Aristotle’s understanding of friendship.  The Nicomachean Ethics (NE) provides a discussion for which to compare and contrast Kierkegaard’s position.  Aristotle’s main argument is that virtue friendship is the culmination of human experience and is truly the pathway to happiness.  Friendship actively engages the intellectual and ethical self; such realization of ethical and intellectual being is good because of itself.  Therefore Aristotle implies friendship, like justice, is both a means and an end to happiness.  By connecting the idea of justice and the practice of friendship, Aristotle contends that friendship is necessary for a functional society.

The fourth section of this paper will include a brief review of secondary literature interpretations of Aristotle’s true friendship.  The secondary literature argues that Aristotle’s discussion of ‘means’ does not account for the vicious persons of the world and is prone to failure in interpretation.  It questions whether Aristotle correctly addresses the proper way in which to attain the ideal type of friendship?

The fifth section of this paper will compare Kierkegaard and Aristotle’s understandings of true friendship.  It will be clear that marriage and virtue types of friendship are compatible but not fully because of their relative scope and pretenses.  Both philosophers’ ideas of true friendship are rooted in common world perception and are thought to be developed with proximity and openness among people.  Friendship as a natural expression of humanity is also an idea shared by both philosophers.  Although, each philosopher differs on the exact form and meaning of true friendship – a difference entrenched in their respective positions on the means and ends of true friendship.  Kierkegaard’s argument seems heavily centered upon the spiritual ends of friendship; while Aristotle’s argument seems to offer a more applicable and balanced understanding of the means and ends of friendship.

The philosophical perceptions and principles presented within this paper will finally be applied to recent controversy between obtaining public services in Quebec and the Muslim tradition of wearing a niqab.  This paper will try to rationalize the state of affairs and will explain the relevance of true friendship as presented in Kierkegaard, Aristotle, and the secondary literature.  Ultimately this paper will attempt to provide clues as to why such an absurd public debate has ensued and what it may mean about the current state of friendship.

Kierkegaard – Marriage as True Friendship

The “Esthetic Validity of Marriage” by Søren Kierkegaard is the first chapter in Part II of the Either/Or collection of works.  The text is written under a pseudonym and in the form of a letter: from Judge William to the younger Johannes, from The Seducers Diary found in the latter of Part I in Either/Or.  In this way, the Either/Or series should be thought of as a dialogue between the aesthete and the ethical, Johannes and the Judge respectively, and provides the reader with contrasting perspectives available in choosing their own life’s path.

More or less representing the ‘Or’ side of Kierkegaard’s debate, the Judge explicates the ethical significance of marriage and the related importance of forming a true friendship with another person.  This is accomplished by comparing the rightness of an ethical approach to life with that of the aesthete.  More specifically, the Judge outlines the shortfalls of the aesthete, citing concern with immediate pleasures and an overly passive approach to life.  The tone of the Judge’s letter is best described as being admonishing towards Johannes.  The Judge is specific in describing the importance of an up-building process Johannes must undergo.[1] The Judge advises Johannes, based on his seniority and personal experience in life, that he should start to consider marriage.

The Judge criticizes Johannes, the ‘seducer,’ for being too cavalier in his personal relations with others.  Johannes is described as being a virtuoso of romantic and erotic love and because of this he is encouraged to establish better forms of friendship and to take life more seriously,

Just consider your life is passing… when you are no longer shown any further possibilities in life, when recollection alone is left, recollection, but not in the sense in which you love so much, this mixture of fiction and truth, but the earnest and faithful recollection of your conscience.[2]

The Judge explores the dangers of Johannes’ lifestyle; whereby it is to be pitied to pursue the ‘abstract’ through moods and living in illusion because it achieves nothing.  In a way Kierkegaard is also criticizing the light-mindedness of his era.  He is critical because of the debauchery he sees with increasing instances of unethical practices within society.  The ‘Either,’ is erotic and romantic love, which are presented and criticized as the aesthete.  The seducer is associated with immorality and illusionary egotism.  Described as a conquering type of behaviour, these forms of relations are considered detrimental to one’s character because it takes the individual further away from a relationship with God.  It is worth noting that both ‘either’ and ‘or’ are intended to represent the extreme instances of perspective one could have.

The Judge compares the physical dispositions of human nature which he believes are to conquer versus to possess.  The superiority is obvious, “It is not the given that is great, but the acquired.”[3] The judge states that true greatness lies in possessing because it focuses on recollection which develops humility, contentment, patience and prayer.  Recollection provides ability for self growth and helps to realize the temporal realities of humanity.  The Judge recognizes that although it is sad to grow old there is a “much more profound sadness that comes over a person if he cannot grow old.”[4] One can surmise that living without concreteness and reflection does not allow one to fully develop as a person.   Furthermore a “healthy individual lives simultaneously in hope and recollection – only thereby does his life gain true and substantive continuity.”[5] To live concretely is to be historical; to be historical is established through true concrete friendships such as marriage.

The Judge argues marriage is superior to romantic love because it is a transfiguration of romantic love; in the same way that romantic love is a transcendence of mere erotic love.  Marital love acquires meaning over time through ‘concentricity’ and because it is both ethical and religious.[6] This depicts a hierarchy of love where marital love is the human ideal because it engages the spiritual self.  Kierkegaard understands that the ethical and religious implicitly positions marriage backwards in time and forwards in time.  The Judge qualifies marital love as the “infinite moment of love.”[7] Furthermore the Judge describes marital love as concentric which implies an inward motion that opens a spiritual dialogue where “it will fight together with God for itself, will gain itself in patience;” which also implies a historical nature inherent to marital love.[8] The Judge also indicates a change of individual identity in the motion of marital love, where a “person who loves… has lost himself in another, but in losing and forgetting himself in the other he is open to the other and in forgetting himself in another he is remembered in the other.”[9] This perspective is further reinforced by the way the text is presented, as a conversation of three minds within one dialogue.  The main voice is represented by the Judge which also includes the secondary perspective of his own wife, while the tertiary perspective is that of Johannes, as anticipated by the Judge.  The fact that the Judge speaks for both him and his wife represents a belief that marriage is an integration of identity and an expansion of personal disposition.

A spouse is described as a friendship of the highest kind because it expands an individual in an external and internal sense.   Marriage is this way because of the close connection that is forged with another human and with God.  It contributes to internal expansion because it is described as reflective love that begins “with a kind of doubt that there was no possibility of loving anyone else.”[10] It is also understood as an active condition based in openness, described as an “absolute awakening” rooted in intuition, or an irresistible force of attraction towards the other.[11] In being open one is giving wholly and transparently which the Judge says is the mark of the ethical.  Openness is accepting actuality, hiding nothing and taking responsibility for each other’s being.  Confident self-assurance exists through one’s openness; a conception of freedom of self helps to overcome any doubt and is equivocal to accepting God’s will.[12] Reflective love is also based in choice or a sense of self-resignation; best described as the willingness to engage in self-denial for the express interest of the other.  Such sacrificial self-interest leads to the external expansion involved in marriage.

Kierkegaard, by way of the Judge, views marriage as “truly a state well-pleasing to God” that embraces faith, oath, humbleness and freedom.  Together these virtues allow a person to understand and strive for the ideal in life in relation to God’s will.  In this way, Kierkegaard understands marriage is a life calling and therefore the pure existence of it is bound in duty.  Kierkegaard has three specific reasons why marriage is important: it ennobles and cultivates character; it enables procreation of the human race; and it creates family and a sense of home.  Marriage is said to rescue an individual from habits, described as the “tyranny of one-sidedness,” and instills character traits like patience, collaboration and understanding.[13] Children are important because God commands “be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth.”[14] Children also are the “greatest and most significant thing in the world” because they teach us about ourselves through an opportunity to once again experience the whole of life through another.[15] Furthermore, children allow for a comprehension of one’s own life and in having a child one creates a sense of home and is able to begin acquiring possessions.  A sense of home is like a sense of concreteness in life.  By fulfilling all three duty-bound reasons with love and truth, one is truly being Christian and is therefore capable of achieving infinite harmony and wisdom.[16] The rationale is that when many people fulfill the duty of marriage they join and contribute to building a permanent sense of human community or a type of Christian society.   This indicates that a proper marriage is a journey of personal transcendence guided by ethics and morality that contributes to an overall societal betterment.

By being ethical one is able to overcome the human condition of doubt and despair and allow their true personality to show, exposing a concrete self.  The Judge depicts this as a moment of choice, whereby “turning one’s face towards the other you choose yourself absolutely.”[17] Using a gentle stream as a metaphor, a marriage is

…quiet, modest, humming.  It does not have many changements (variations), and yet it is like that water, running, and yet like that water, it has melody, dear to the one who knows it, dear to him precisely because he knows it.[18]

That is to say, being ethical creates a stable sense of self, in agreement with God, and it is because of this that each proper friendship will lead one to choose the good and always make the right choice in their own self becoming.  Such transcendence occurs in a hierarchal fashion; first one’s being is aesthetic, then one becomes ethical, and finally by being spiritual one forges a connection with God, akin to the human pinnacle of life.  “Just as nothing is impossible for God, so nothing is impossible for the religious individual either.”[19] In the journey to know oneself, a spouse is a person’s truest and closest friend that helps elevate oneself to a spiritual level, in connection with God.  Together marriage partners gain courage and strength in their love and spirituality and with God can overcome any challenge in life.

The wedding ceremony is of particular importance for Kierkegaard.  He describes marriage as a uniquely human ceremony that blesses the relationship with a higher unity and connection with God.  Marriage is a union of the universal and particular, “you are also a couple just like them; the same event is being repeated here in you, and you also are standing here alone in the infinite world, alone in the presence of God.”[20] The express intention and the concreteness of the declaration that constitutes a marriage ceremony allows each person in the relationship to be free and Kierkegaard believes that “the freer the individual the more aesthetically beautiful the marriage.”[21] This indicates that Kierkegaard’s motive for marriage is more concerned with appearance and perspective of those from outside the marriage.  Although this is balanced by the statement, “It takes courage to be willing to appear as one really is; it takes courage not to want to buy oneself off from a little humiliation when one can do this by a certain secretiveness…”[22] The concern with outsider’s perception is overcome by the personal development that takes place as a result of the marriage ceremony.  In this way the ceremony of marriage should appeal to the esthetic while fulfilling and bringing the individuals closer to God.

So far this paper has interpreted the main argument of Kierkegaard where the truest form of friendship is experienced through marriage.  Marriage is depicted as an existential reality.  Marriage is a condition for achieving the best form of human existence.  That is, marriage is the means to happiness as experienced through closer spiritual connection with God.  Kierkegaard has provided a spiritual foundation to connect with another person which will be instrumental in my final understanding of true friendship.  Let the discussion now shift to secondary interpretations of Kierkegaard.

Secondary Interpretations of Kierkegaard

This paper will now examine three relevant secondary literature sources in an attempt to expand the understanding of Kierkegaard’s argument.  Is friendship based in marriage really the ultimate form of transcendence for humans?

In his article “Kierkegaard from the Point of View of the Political,” Graham Smith interprets Kierkegaard’s understanding of the political as best understood as being grounded within the spiritual self.  Smith understands Kierkegaard’s main argument as shedding light on selfhood and how it relates to humanity.  The article suggests that any of the varying forms of human political community, be it facism or democracy, have relative shortcomings when compared to the potentiallity of spiritually connected beings.  Since Kierkegaard is considered devoutly Christian there is a recognition that in existence everyone has an implicit responsibility for one another’s wellbeing.  Smith understands Kierkegaard’s perspective as being a concern for society’s overall well-being; the politics of the Judge’s era is depicted as suffering from despair.  Despair is “the failure of the self to relate in the correct way to God (and from this point to others).”[23] To have faith in God is the correct relation with God and will free one from despair.  In this way, Smith interprets Kierkegaard’s self as being either animal or divine in nature – Kierkegaard presents the dichotomy of human nature as a choice.

Smith interprets Kierkegaard’s understanding of the modern political subject and arena as being harsh and pessimistic.

For Kierkegaard modern political subjects veer towards a mistaken sociality: a sociality that manifests in a self-interestedness and anonymity which undermines selfhood. Such a sociality does not take the task of selfhood seriously… Therefore, political life is empty because its participants are empty.[24]

Smith argues that Kierkegaard’s view of his era was that most people do not comprehend the task before them and are unable to relate to the ideal in life.  This is worrisome for Kierkegaard because these people are are therefore incapable of spiritual and moral transcendence.  This brings about the questions, is Kierkegaard’s standard for true friendship set too high for the average person?  Afterall, many people appear to find happiness in life without marriage including devoutly religious priests and monks.  Kierkegaard himself writes from a religious perspective but does not account for his form of true friendship being too exclusive, which it may be.

The chapter “Married Man as Master Thief in Either/Or,” from Amy Hall’s book Kierkegaard and the Treachery of Love, provides a basis to examine Kierkegaard’s fundamental argument of Either/Or.  Hall describes the fundamental necessity of choosing one’s ideals in life as a responsibility – as almost a paradoxical expression in choosing to achieve the self and the ideal self in harmony together.  She understands the Judge’s version of aesthetic interest as being “obtusely cheerful” and that “his domesticated salvation preys upon the solicitous work of his wife.”[25] The dutiful life outlined by the Judge is described as being muscular and implicitly characterizes a woman’s subservient role within the domestic order.[26] In this way, Hall provides a feminist perspective which attempts to expose Kierkegaard’s viewpoint of the ethical as not being transcendence of the human soul.  Hall understands Kierkegaard’s marriage as simply a socially accepted extension of the aesthetic; which should not be viewed as ethical because he implicitly advocates for the subjugation of women.

Hall understands the love for woman exists as a source of pleasure for both the Judge and the seducer.  The fundamental difference is that the Judge’s ethical love is deep and prolonged whereas Johannes’ aesthetic love is shallow and sporadic.[27] Hall interprets the Judge’s marital love as being portrayed as supreme because it is taken into higher concentricity when conferring with God.  In this way, the Judge advocates eroticism that is “enabled by Christian marriage [which] vindicates Christianity as the ‘highest development of the human race.”[28] Hall questions who is really loved in such a three-way relationship between man, woman and God; the answer is that the Judge “continues to use woman as the intercessor who connects him with the finite.”[29] She argues that in much the same way the seducer seeks a pure virgin woman the Judge is also involved in a parastic relationship that is more subtle and based upon a more complex end.

Hall’s interpretation of Kierkegaard questions the stability of his interpretation of the friendship of marriage as really the truest form of friendship.  Hall suggests Kierkegaard’s understanding of marriage as a relationship where the wife “belongs solely to God,” should be considered sacreligious for the Judge claims he is “everything to (his) wife.”[30] This hints that the Judge himself has a contradictory understanding of his own true love.  Hall interprets Kierkegaard’s marital relationship as not about intimate human connection but instead a vehicle for gaining spiritual acceptance among the Christian community.  This begs the questions – is Kierkegaard’s marital love really the truest form of friendship?  If one is not a Christian is Kierkegaard’s model of true friendship at all applicable?  Is true friendship different for men and women?

Chapter two of Stephen Evans’ book Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love: Divine Commands and Moral Obligations, provides an account of the ethical as a stage of existence.  The basis of Evan’s argument rests on the fact that as a whole Kierkegaard’s writings did not really add much to the understanding of human nature but instead consistently called into question human systems.[31] He notes that Kierkegaard does hold traditional stereotypes of the role of men and women in society and contrary to Hall, he does not recognize Kierkegaard as misogynistic.  Evans argues that taken from the highest level of spirituality there is a “fundamental equality between men and women.”[32] Evan’s chapter focuses on Either/Or as being a presentation of the ethical and aesthetic as competing viewpoints on how to live.

The key argument of Part II, as understood by Evans, is that a person’s ideals have direct role in determining the actions undertaken by an individual and are deeply rooted in the ethical.  In consciously choosing the ethical, a person will choose that which is right and will find meaning in their life.  Evans believes the fundamental question at stake for Kierkegaard is whether to “take choice itself seriously, to seek ideals for which a person can live or die” in order to overcome desires by establishing and living up to commitments.[33] Evans believes that the aesthetic and ethical are stances of “existential spheres which can define a person’s life as a whole.”[34] In this way, the aesthetic is based in desire and want, where the ethical is based in commitment and self-sacrifice.  In rejecting the fundamental choice of ideals, the ethical, a person is subject to meaninglessness and a boredom wrought life, which ultimately leads to despair and depression which is understood as the lowest form of human existence.  Evans interpretation indicates that the suffering brought on by guilt sparks a change within a person towards becoming religious and ethical.

Taken together, these three secondary literature interpretations add to our understanding of Kierkegaard.  However, each present some potential shortcomings in Kierkegaard’s true friendship.  Smith recognizes Kierkegaard’s belief that marriage is inherently good in and of itself.  Yet, Smith understands Part II of Either/Or as a lament of the relative shortcomings of the age and Kierkegaard is fundamentally pressing for greater ethical practice and therefore greater sprituality.  Smith’s interpretation begs the question – is Kierkegaard too exclusive in his standard for true friendship?  Hall understands Kierkegaard as a mysoginist.  Her interpretation of marriage as true friendship is not congruent with Kierkegaard.  Hall interpets Kierkegaard’s marriage as the domestication of the female in the express interest of the male’s spirituality, somewhat akin to thievery.  She rejects marriage as true friendship because the goal of spiritual connection with God incites usery for personal gain which takes away from the friendliness of the relationship.  This begs the question – is true friendship the same for both men and women?  Evans, however, rebuffs Hall’s interpretation of Kierkegaard as a mysoginist.  Although Evans argues Kierkegaard did not add much to our understanding of human nature.  Instead he believes Kierkegaard presents a choice between the ethical, and in turn a connection with God, with that of the aesthetic which offers only a meaningless life of despair without God.  In essence a choice of either a full life or an empty life.

The secondary literature brings about many questions, is Kierkegaard’s choice too Christian and exclusive, mysoginistic and unethical, or simply an unattainable standard of friendship?  Moving forward, in an attempt to expand our understanding of true friendship this paper will now examine Aristotle’s argument.  As an old-world philosopher Aristotle comprehends true friendship slightly differently than Kierkegaard; true friendship is not simply found in marriage but is an expression of virtuous moral character.

Aristotle – Friendship as Virtue

Aristotle provides a good source of reflection for Kierkegaard’s interpretations of true friendship.  It is well documented that Kierkegaard studied Aristotle’s work and wrote in reference to him.  In an attempt to establish linkages between Kierkegaard’s Either/Or and Aristotle we will specifically examine the Nicomachean Ethics (NE).  More specifically this paper will focus on Book VIII and IX, respectively described as friendship in relation to community and the self.  It will be clear that true friendship is not excluded to just marriage between a man and woman – but is possible among people of similar essence.

Utility, pleasure and virtue are the three types of friendship described by Aristotle in Book VIII of the NE.  Of the three types, friendship based in virtue is the most important to this discussion.  Virtue friendship is described as a relationship built on mutual love for one another, an attraction of those with likeness of moral character.  Such friendship is the epitome of existence, of action and feeling, in one’s quest to develop a virutous moral character.

Virtuous moral character is the ultimate goal of human life and should be thought of as the fostering of proper action and proper desire.  Described thoroughly in Book II, Aristotle’s description of human characteristics is based upon a choice consisting of means between excess and deficiency in both feelings and action.  An example of human nature described by Aristotle is that of:

Pleasures and pains – though not all of them and less so concerning pains – the mean condition is temperance and the excess is dissipation.  Those who fall short concerning pleasure don’t turn up very often, for which reason they and their sort have not happened on a name, but let them be termed ‘insensible.’[35]

Based on this, to be virtuous in pleasure one must find the mean in their action between tempering the act of indulgence in sweet treats and the suppression of such desires.  That is one must find pleasure in the right measure while avoiding the vice in extreme action and feeling like that of hedonism and ascetecism.  As with other virtues like courage, anger and truth, the NE argues it is of utmost importance to learn how to act within the unpredictability of life.  Furthermore knowing how to be properly affected by any circumstance is the path to a contented and full life.

The culmination of human life is where one knows how to act and feel and is described as one having virtuous moral character.  Aristotle understands like-mindedness of virtuous moral character among a group of people as something similar to friendship.[36] Aristotle believes that a “good person ought to be a lover of self, since he will both profit himself and benefit the others by performing beautiful actions.”[37] This suggests that a person must first love himself and in doing so will understand what is necessary to bring about his individual happiness.  Equipped with such wisdom an individual further develops a virtuous nature by means of active friendships.  Aristotle explicitly states that no happy person would willingly choose to have all good things for only himself “for a human being is meant for a city and is of such a nature as to live with others.”[38] This suggests that in addition to being virtuously beautiful, friendship is necessary for a healthy society.

The culmination of moral character within society could be thought of as the preconditions necessary for justice.  Justice is necessary for a healthy society and is based in equality and reciprocity; justice is described as being either conventional or natural.[39] Conventional justice is a common bond that exists between citizens of a polity and is most apparent in the laws of the land.  His discussion makes it apparent that friendship is an expression of the “fully developed virtue of character” and should be thought of as “more natural than justice.”[40] In this way, Aristotle links justice with friendship because it is naturally based in equality and reciprocity.  Like justice, friendship brings about happiness which is good for its own sake.

A genuine friendship is like justice because a person recognizes the inherent value of his neighbor and naturally wishes for the best in the other’s life.  “So like-mindedness seems to be friendship in a political sense, just as people mean it, for it has to do with what is advantageous and what relates to life.”[41] In virtuous relationships both parties must actively engage in loving one another.  Aristotle is satisfied believing that a good friendship is both a means and an end in achieving such goodness in life.  “Equality or similarity is friendship, and especially the similarity that comes from virtue, since such people are constant in themselves and stay constant toward one another.”[42] This means that people are attracted to one another as a result of similarities in values, habit, and intellect.  This also implies that people are attracted to constancy in such relationships, perhaps because of the predictability of behaviour that develops around friendships.

Aristotle contends human well-being is the highest good in human life to be achieved and is akin to happiness.  Such goodness is possible in the form of virtuous friendship because friendship itself develops an understanding of correct moral feeling and action.  Aristotle states that “those who give freely to one another for their own sake are free of complaints,” which seems to suggest that by engaging in the practice of friendship a life of contentment is likely to follow.[43] In this way, Aristotle believes that friendship is the greatest of external goods because together friends can develop moral sensibilities since friends engage in the exchange of favours they are obviously concerned with the welfare of fellow human beings.[44] In addition to such moral virtue, Aristotle contends that friendship also develops intellectual virtues.  Aristotle believes in order for friendship to flourish one “…ought to share in a friend’s awareness that he is and this would come through living together and sharing conversation and thinking.”[45] The preconditions for friendship exist in living together since proximity enables conversation among humans.

Conversation and shared contemplation allows people to actively engage their intellectual perception and reasoning abilities.  The intellectual virtue of contemplation is characterized by constancy or perseverance of virtuous action that includes dialectic improvements of one’s persona by way of help that only a friendship can provide.  Such close interaction of humans allows intellectual virtue to arise from commonalities that grow with greater association of one another “and they seem to become even better people by putting the friendship to work and by straightening one another out.”[46] This is to suggest that friendship by virtue actually expands the human soul and contributes to the betterment of each individual’s overall character through a type of dialectic process.

Aristotle recognizes that political community is made up of the sum of its parts.  Wherein different types of communities may be characterized by different forms of friendship – all of which together form a greater sense of political community.  The civil relationship that exists in political community both serves individuals and is shaped by an individual’s interaction within society.  Persons of the same city share the same sense of justice and a common purpose; as such, Aristotle understands the form of friendship changes based on different regimes.  The aggregation of virtuous moral character leads to the betterment of society’s overall character.  Aristotle points out “training in virtue would come from living among good people.”[47] Two examples of differences in friendship are found in Chapter 10 of Book VIII, in the regime of kingship friendship is based on beneficense and should be thought of as being similar to a father and son relationship.  Similarly, in the aristocratic regime friendship is based on merit and should be thought of as similar to the relationship between man and wife.  In the case of virtuous friendships, “friends who are equal ought, in accord with their equality, to be equal in loving and all the rest, while those who are unequal ought to give what is proportional to the superiority.”[48] Such equality in loving leads to unconditional reciprocity and a sense of other regarding which is beneficial regardless of the regime’s form.

When humans are conscious of those around them and are genuinely concerned with their well-being Aristotle describes this as the full activation of humanity; for the “highest good of human life is promoting human well-being.”[49] This type of happiness is found in true friendship, which could also be called contemplative friendship; such friendship is the end goal of human life for Aristotle because there is no further level of human satisfaction that could be hoped for.  An important distinction to keep in mind, is that friendship is based in action and constancy, therefore true friendship is never fully achieved but instead should be constantly experienced.

Secondary Interpretations of Aristotle

To expand our understanding of Aristotle’s core argument of friendship as an expression of virtuous moral character this paper will now focus on secondary literature interpretations of the Nicomachean Ethics.  This discussion will include articles from Rosalind Hursthouse, and Ian Adams and R.W. Dyson.  In order to expand this paper’s understanding of Aristotle’s contemplative friendship this paper will determine if Aristotle correctly addresses the forms of friendship and the proper way in which one is to attain such an ideal type of existence.

In Rosalind Hursthouse’s article, “The Central Doctrine of the Mean,” she understands Aristotle’s assertion that the virtuous succeed in finding the mean of action and feeling.  However, because the mean is understood as being relative to the circumstances and is determined by one’s own personal motivation, Aristotle’s standard is prone to failure because even the incompetent and vicious could behave as a virtuous person.  She gives the example:

…bent on deceiving my husband, I aim at “the mean relative to the circumstances,” being careful to avoid appearing too eager that he should go away for a week, without annoying him by appearing too indifferent, arranging to visit some of his relatives but not so many as to leave me without enough time to spend with my lover – and may well hit upon it readily enough if I am clever.[50]

This example provides context, within a marriage, where one can appear to be virtuous without having the actuality of being so.  This is a major blow to Aristotle’s understanding of virtuousness because it suggests a breakdown in his reasoning.  It suggests that it is possible to obtain a suitable and virtuous mean by employing false extremes.  If anyone can appear virtuous, then could they also appear to have the overall virutousness of character necessary for the precondition of true friendship?  If that is the case, then a clever person could deceive others into a contemplative friendship that is indeed not virtuous.

However, this fails to take into account that Aristotle argues constancy is a necessary element in virtuous being.  A vicious person is prone to extremes in action which means if they try to appear virtuous they may only be able to do so for a short time before others notice.  Aristotle argues that through practical wisdom and experience virtuous people can detect such vicious people and would not associate with them.  Therefore a vicious person is incapable of experiencing the highest and best form of friendship because a virtuous person would not engage in the act of friendship in the first place.

Adams and Dyson believe that Aristotle recognizes that although there are numerous forms of friendship there is only one true type of friendship that can bring about the greatest pleasures available in life.  Virtue friendship is most important because of the active disposition to reason.  In actively ‘being a friend’ one engages the entirety of their sense of being and shares their existence with another human being through all human experiences such as the sensations of satisfaction, pain, sadness, joy, excitement, and debate.  Aristotle’s message is that “the good of others can make an important contribution to our own good.”[51] Virtue friendship is affirmed as being supreme true friendship for Adams and Dyson because of the expansion of the self that occurs; specifically the stimulation of philosophical understanding which thereby expands individual capabilities and one’s own satisfaction of existence in this world.  Within this understanding one must question – is it possible for a vicious person to overcome their shortcomings and become a virtuous person through marriage?  Or perhaps more importantly, is it possible for a virtuous person to uplift a vicious person to virtuosity through such an exclusive friendship?

Critical Interpretation of Kierkegaard and Aristotle

Now that we have an acceptable level of understanding of each philosopher, how do Kierkegaard and Aristotle compare with each other?

First let us state the similarities between the two understandings of friendship offered by Kierkegaard and Aristotle.  In both cases the philosophers were sure to establish the rarity of occurrence of true friendship in life; in Chapter 6 of Book VIII Aristotle limits such friendship to a few good people, while Kierkegaard limits such friendship to one instance found only in the married life.  A maximum on true friendships is necessary for both philosophers because such relationships are based on stability and concreteness.  To illustrate true friendship Kierkegaard uses the metaphor of a single stream that is constant, modest and obvious only to those who understand it.  Meanwhile, Aristotle’s logic for a limit on true friendship is based on the contention that there are only so many good people naturally available to be friends with.

Both philosophers agree that proximity, openness and equality are preconditions for a successful friendship.  The concentricity of marriage for Kierkegaard leads to a special closeness of existence to the point that each individual identities become one single entity.  In a marriage, Kierkegaard understands an openness and freedom of spirit exists which leads to one’s personal transcendence.  Aristotle contends that virtue friendship is a culmination of virtue that is based within conversation with another.  Aristotle understands that uninhibited conversation in the company of a friend leads to active reasoning which enables one to become morally and intellectually enlightened.

Both philosophers can be understood within each other’s argument.  The greatest instance of similarity between how Kierkegaard understands friendship that is found within Aristotle’s framework is based within the example of the aristocratic regime.  Aristotle describes friendship in an aristocratic regime as being based on that which is right or what corresponds to what is best.  Aristotle describes this as alike to friendship between man and wife where the relationship is based on merit and actively engages what each does best, like a woman bearing children while the man provides sustenance.  Meanwhile, the greatest instance of similarity between Aristotle’s understandings of friendship within Kierkegaard’s framework of true friendship is the close parallel in forging a spiritual connection with the infinitude.  Aristotle understands happiness (a sense of the infinite) as being experienced through the benefits of virtue friendship.  A contemplative friendship enhances one’s understanding of the world through philosophy.  This is similar to Kierkegaard’s understanding of happiness that is based in marriage because it elevates one in a spiritual conversation with God that leads to one’s own acceptance of reality and finite being.

Of course, there are differences in the two philosopher’s understanding of true friendship.  The most obvious difference is found in Kierkegaard’s express doctrine-based religiosity and the lack of any such religiosity in Aristotle.  Kierkegaard advocates marriage as the means to an end, where the end goal is a closer relationship with God.  Aristotle, on the other hand, advocates a universal viewpoint where the act of friendship is both the means and the end of achieving human happiness.  That is, friendship brings about happiness and is happiness.

Kierkegaard understands true friendship in relation to the ethical and as related to the institution of marriage that is based in commitment and responsibility.  The relative success of such true friendships is preconditioned on shared ethical belief and in being Christian.  This creates a triangle of relation – between the self, the other person and God.  The spiritual connection with God brings about happiness; therefore marriage as true friendship is a means of achieving such a connection.  Kierkegaard places great significance in the marital relationship by saying the “greater the probability that something can be repeated, the less meaning… the less the probability, the greater the meaning.”[52] This is reaffirmed by his understanding that divorce is akin to being a traitor to love; a failure of the delicate nature of marriage.[53] In this way, Kierkegaard understands that since a truly great marriage comes into existence only once in a lifetime it is must be the ultimate and truest form of friendship.

Aristotle understands friendship a little differently.  He views true friendship as an understanding of the ethical that arises from within and is best developed through engaging true friends in conversation and reasoning.  Aristotle sees friendship as based within the individual as a sense of striving.  For Aristotle, one must first know how to feel and act in order to be capable of friendship; in first being a friend to oneself a capability of friendship with others is then possible.  He also understands that true friendships are not permanent, but are subject to change over time.  Aristotle understands that by experiencing true friendship, through shared contemplation and reason, one is actively being happy, which is good in and of itself.  Virtue friendship, by way of its existence, actually expands the human soul and contributes to the betterment of one’s overall character.  Aristotle is not clear as to what form such a true friendship would take; however his description seems to infer that a proper marriage would be an adequate fit.

Both philosophers have a different understanding of true friendship in relation to the self.  Aristotle understands that friendship is based in equality and a shared sense of virtuous morality that is more akin to natural justice.  Aristotle also connects the idea of friendship and the different manifestations with different types of regimes.  The connection that Aristotle draws is that friendship is relational from self to self.   On the other hand, Kierkegaard does recognize equality as a central precondition for true friendship; he does not, however, speak of justice or of friendship in relation to justice.  He fails to directly connect friendship to the larger political community and conceptualizes friendship merely as an individual connection from self to God.  Based on this we can conclude that Aristotle has more of an intellectual focus in trying to broaden the scope of his teachings to be relational to everyone within the polis.  The message of Aristotle is clear, friendship is necessary and the best form is found in actively sharing thought with others.  Whereas Kierkegaard is more narrowly focused on the spiritual and writes to prove marital love as being supreme.  He does not link true friendship to the overall political community but instead attempts to further a specific viewpoint of a tight-knit religious community that he views as superior.

This paper has so far established a foundation of Kierkegaard and Aristotle’s arguments of how true friendship should be thought of.  By comparing and contrasting the two philosophers’ arguments this paper has provided a basis for my own interpretation of the truest form of friendship.  True friendship should be thought of as a balance between the spiritual, the intellectual, the self, and another human being.  These three fundamental elements of being must be properly triangulated to provide human society with the greatest benefits of civilization.  Marriage seems to be a natural and adequate form to embody such a true friendship in its entirety.

Niqab Controversy in Perspective

The final section of this paper will apply my understanding of true friendship as a means of rationalizing the recent niqab controversy in Quebec. The recent controversy in Quebec, Canada is over group rights versus individual rights.  In particular the issue surrounds the offering of public services to people who cover their face with a niqab.  The Globe and Mail recently reported that

“Quebec’s Bill 94… would refuse government services, public employment, educational opportunities and even most medical care to Muslim women wearing the niqab.”[54]

A niqab is a garment worn by Muslim women that most often leaves only the eyes visible while covering the body, face and hair.  To wear the niqab is to adhere to hijab religious and cultural tradition.

It is reasonable to expect that such religious and individual expression would be allowable in the multicultural and religiously free nation of Canada.  However, this appears not to be the case in Quebec.  Is the decision to limit the delivery of public services to people practicing protected religious expressions basically against the democratic nature of Canadian society?  Can either side, the niqab-wearer or the province, be fully justified in their position?

The niqab garment is rooted in religious practice and conceals a woman’s body to the benefit of herself and her husband.  By concealing a woman’s identity while in public she is free from the hassle of wandering eyes and unwanted attention – it is almost a barrier against strangers.  In this way, the idea of the niqab is akin to Kierkegaard’s understanding of true friendship.  In wearing the niqab and adhering to religious practice one is able to develop a spiritual self.  Similarly, the niqab limits most personal human interaction to include only the woman’s husband, family and closest friends.  This reaffirms Kierkegaard’s triangle of relation – the self – the other self – and most importantly, God.  In Kierkegaard’s way, the niqab is very particular in establishing human connection.

If the niqab is such an important personal garment and Canada is a free nation with a history of establishing distinctness within society then why is there controversy?  Critics argue that the niqab is a misogynist instrument; a viewpoint that is, to some degree, in accord with Amy Hall’s interpretation of Kierkegaard’s shortcomings of marital friendship.  Is this congruent with the majority viewpoint of Quebecers with a strong history of Catholicism?  In this fashion, perhaps the niqab issue should be interpreted as a clash of cultures.

Aristotle, on the other hand, explains true friendship existing within the universal but his belief is preconditioned on knowing oneself first.  Wearing a niqab is a way of establishing one’s own identity in Quebec and is a direct expression of one’s uniqueness.  This should not come as being out of the ordinary in a place that has strove to create a distinct identity in and of itself since confederation.

Perhaps the majority of Quebecers seem to hold greater for support Aristotle’s universal understanding of friendship.  Society as a group seems to have a yearning to establish a connection between the self and self as a way to forge political community.  Such a perspective would argue that intellectual connections between the self and community is the best way of establishing true friendships and creating a better society.  Covering the body in such a conservative fashion eliminates any such opportunity to see facial expressions which in turn limits the extent of an intellectual linkage among common people.  The limited freedom and openness of exchange between the niqab wearer and people in society may lead to feelings of mistrust and a sense of cultural threat.

To a certain extent the niqab controversy could be thought of as borne from within extreme expression of Kierkegaard’s viewpoint of spiritual discipleship in marital love.  Similarly the controversy may be based within Aristotle’s interpretation of the need to know oneself before being capable of any form of friendship.  Since both philosophers argue the need for humans to promote the well-being of others they would most likely be equally dismayed at the subjugation of cultural uniqueness and expression of true friendship in Quebec’s attempted suppression of niqabs.  After all, Kierkegaard argues that marriage is necessary to fully develop oneself concretely and Aristotle contends that justice naturally arises from such true friendship.

Quebec please take note and be a better friend to each citizen by respecting the rights of association, intellectual and spiritual pursuit, and by recognizing every citizen as an individual.

Bibliography

Adams, Ian, and R Dyson. Fifty Major Political Thinkers. 2^nd edition. New York: Routledge, 2003.

Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Edited by Albert Kieth Witaker. Translated by Joe Sachs. Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing, 2002.

Evans, Stephen. Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love: Divine Commands and Moral Obligations. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Hall, Amy. Kierkegaard and the Treachery of Love. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Hursthouse, Rosalind. “The Central Doctrine of the Mean.” In The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, by Richard Kraut, 97-115. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006.

Kierkegaard, Søren. Either/Or. Edited by Howard J. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Vol. II. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987.

Orwin, Clifford. “No room at the Inn for Veiled Women? Get Real Canada.” Globe and Mail, March 31, 2010: Opinions.

Pakaluk, Michael. “Friendship.” Chap. 29 in A Companion to Aristotle, edited by Georgios Anaganostopoulos, 471-482. Chichester, West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing, 2009.

Smith, Graham M. “Kierkegaard from the Point of View of the Political.” History of European Ideas, 2005: 35-60.

[2] Ibid., 16.

[3] Ibid., 131.

[4] Ibid., 87.

[5] Ibid., 142.

[6] Ibid., 36,47.

[7] Ibid., 112.

[8] Ibid., 97.

[9] Ibid., 110.

[10] Ibid., 29.

[11] Ibid., 42.

[12] Ibid., 47.

[13] Ibid., 68.

[14] Ibid., 69.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid., 148.

[17] Ibid., 177.

[18] Ibid., 144.

[19] Ibid., 20.

[20] Ibid., 90.

[21] Ibid., 94.

[22] Ibid., 105.

[23] Smith, Graham M. “Kierkegaard from the Point of View of the Political.” History of European Ideas, 2005, 39.

[24] Ibid., 49.

[25] Hall, Amy. Kierkegaard and the Treachery of Love. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, 110.

[26] Ibid., 111.

[27] Ibid., 113.

[28] Quoted from Kierkegaard, 31; as found in Hall, 114.

[29] Hall, Kierkegaard and the Treachery of Love, 121.

[30] Quoted from Kierkegaard, 81; as found in Hall, 119.

[31] Evans, Stephen. Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love: Divine Commands and Moral Obligations. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, 34.

[32] Ibid., 43.

[33] Ibid., 47.

[34] Ibid., 48.

[35] Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Edited by Albert Kieth Witaker. Translated by Joe Sachs. Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing, 2002, II.7.1107b5.

[36] Ibid., VIII.1.1155a25.

[37] Ibid., IX.9.1169b10-19.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Ibid., V.5.1133b; V.7.1134b.

[40] Ibid., footnote 232, 144.

[41] Ibid., IX.6.1167b.

[42] Ibid., VIII.8.1159b.

[43] Ibid., IX.1.1164b.

[44] Ibid., IX.9.1169b10.

[45] Ibid., IX.9.1170b10.

[46] Ibid., IX.9.1170b12.

[47] Ibid., IX.9-1169b10-19.  

[48] Ibid., VIII.13.1162b.

[49] Ibid., IX.9.1169b10. 

[50] Hursthouse, Rosalind. “The Central Doctrine of the Mean.” In The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, by Richard Kraut, 97-115. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006, 104.

[51] Adams, Ian, and R Dyson. Fifty Major Political Thinkers. 2^nd edition. New York: Routledge, 2003, 16.

[52] Kierkegaard, 40.

[53] Ibid., 33.

[54] Orwin, Clifford. “No room at the Inn for Veiled Women? Get Real Canada.” Globe and Mail, March 31, 2010: Opinions.